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JUSTICE THROUGH SYNTHESIS: THE SECOND
CIRCUIT CREATES A NONPERPETRATOR
TEST FOR CIVIL FORFEITURE ACTIONS
Clinton Hughes*
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following two scenarios:
A homeowner in Malibu, California, allows his grown son to
continue living with him at home, even though he knows the son
has a longstanding problem with drugs.' The son had been arrested
for dealing drugs ten years before, and had been admitted to a
rehabilitation clinic at least once.2 The father may have reason to
know his son is still involved with drugs, perhaps even dealing
again, but he does not ask his son to move out.3 After receiving a
tip from an informant, the local police raid the house, finding
$15,000.00 worth of cocaine, four and a half grams of psilocybin
mushrooms and a three-foot-tall marijuana plant.4 Both father and
son are arrested, but the father is acquitted of all state criminal
charges.' Now the federal government brings a forfeiture action
against the father's home, which has an estimated worth of
$925,000.00.6
. Brooklyn Law School Class of 1997. The author wishes to thank Brooklyn
Law School Professors Susan N. Herman and Minna J. Kotkin for their insightful
assistance in preparing this Note. Many thanks also to Patrick C. McGuinness
and Nancy A. Slahetka, Brooklyn Law School Class of 1997, for their technical
support and a fruitful ongoing dialogue on civil forfeiture.
United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 736 (C.D. Cal.
1994).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 730.
4Id
' Id. at 735.
6 Id. at 730.
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The second scenario takes place in upstate New York where a
woman also has a grown son with drug problems living at home.7
He has a special fascination for growing marijuana, storing
marijuana-growing supplies in her basement, keeping various drug
paraphernalia in his room and displaying on his bookshelf a framed
photograph of himself next to a six-foot tall marijuana plant.' To
get him out of the house, the mother helps him buy an eighty-five-
acre tract of land outside of town, and helps him build a farmhouse
there "so he can do his farming."9 The son conveys title to his
mother for one dollar, but remains living on the land.' When the
police later raid the farm, they find 1362 marijuana plants, as well
as seeds, scales and a gun." The government institutes a civil
forfeiture action against the property, claiming that the mother was
well aware of her son's marijuana production, and effectively
conspired with him to grow the illegal crop.
12
These two cases have led to landmark federal court decisions,
epitomizing how modern civil forfeiture 3 has collided with the
' United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 1995).
8Id.
9Id.
1o Id. at 842.
" Id. at 843, 848.
12 Id. at 843.
13 "Forfeiture" is defined as a "divestiture of specific property without
compensation; it imposes a loss by the taking away of some preexisting valid
right without compensation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 650 (6th ed. 1990).
State and federal laws utilizing forfeiture can allow for forfeiture of
"property used in the commission of a crime ... as well as property acquired
from the proceeds of the crime." Id. In Milbrand, the federal government sued
under the Federal Controlled Substance Act of 1970. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)
(1994).
Criminal forfeiture is an in personam action, where the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the property owner used the property in a
criminal enterprise. See Gary M. Maveal, Criminalizing Civil Forfeitures, 74
MICH. B.J. 658, 658 (1995). Usually, the owner retains possession of the
property until convicted. Id. In civil forfeitures, however, the government need
only show by probable cause of criminal conduct before seizing the property. Id




Eighth Amendment. 14 Both cases demonstrate how courts since
the Supreme Court's decision in Austin v United States 5 have
struggled to resolve civil forfeiture actions brought against
homeowners who have not committed the underlying offense, but
may have known that drug activity was taking place on their
property. 16
Austin and its progeny represent a response to a 1984 amend-
ment to the Controlled Substances Act,'7 which amended civil
forfeitures to include real property where drug activity was taking
place.' 8 While the amendment provides for an "innocent owner"
Subsequently, use of civil forfeiture has resulted in a "blending with
criminal sanctions" in order to "complement enforcement of the criminal law."
Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve
Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil
Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1327, 1344 (1991).
14 The Eighth Amendment provides that: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
15 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). The district court in Austin allowed forfeiture of
the petitioner's body shop and mobile home after he pled guilty to possessing
cocaine with intent to distribute under state law. Id. at 2803. In affirming the
trial court's decision, the Eighth Circuit stated that it had to "reluctantly agree"
with the government that current caselaw did not prevent forfeiture, even though
the court opined that it was "exacting too high a penalty in relation to the offense
committed." United States v. Austin, 954 F.2d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 1992). The
Supreme Court reversed, holding unanimously that civil forfeiture based on a
property's facilitation of criminal activity was considered a punishment for
Eighth Amendment purposes, and as such was subject to the Excessive Fines
Clause. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811. Essentially, Austin added a second defense to
the federal civil forfeiture statute by allowing the claimant to show that civil
forfeiture in that case was constitutionally excessive.
16 See, e.g., United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d. 841 (2d Cir. 1995); United
States v. 143-147 East 23rd Street, 888 F.Supp. 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding
forfeiture also excessive under Milbrand multifactor test), aff'd, 77 F.3d 648 (2d
Cir. 1996); United States v. Zumirez, 845 F. Supp. 725 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
Property owners who allow illegal activities to transpire on their property but
who do not actually commit the underlying offense in a forfeiture action are
referred to as "nonperpetrating owners" throughout this Note.
17 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-950 (1994).
18 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1994). The key 1984 amendment to the Controlled
Substances Act (the "Act") was the real property provision, which mandated that:
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defense, 9 there are no other statutory safeguards for owners who,
as in the two scenarios described above, may have knowingly
allowed others to continue illegal activities on their premises.2z
In Austin, the Supreme Court partly remedied this lack of
statutory protection by ruling that civil forfeiture constituted
punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes.2' The Court did not,
[a]ll real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any
leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any
appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used,
in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of,
a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's
imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any
act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or
omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7).
19 The "innocent owner" statutory defense places the burden of proof on an
owner to establish that any drug activity on the premises was committed "without
the knowledge or consent of that owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7).
20 United States v. 461 Shelby County Road, 857 F. Supp. 935, 938-39
(N.D. Ala. 1994). The court in Shelby illustrated the quandary of an owner
knowing about limited drug activity on the property and therefore not having any
statutory protection:
simply knowing about a small marijuana deal, while theoretically
destroying the "innocence" of the owner for the purpose of exposing
his illegally-used real property to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. §881
(a)(7), does not itself constitute a federal crime. This fact makes it
difficult, if not impossible, to determine the degree of such an owner's
culpability for the purpose of assessing him a "fine" to appropriately
punish him for not having committed a crime but rather for not telling
on another for that other's criminal conduct. This court has not found
a statute in the United States Code making it a crime to fail to
promptly report a state or federal crime. There is, of course, the
obvious distinction between "aiding and abetting" a crime, on the one
hand, and "failing to report a crime," on the other.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, although Shelby dealt with a claimant who had
perpetrated the underlying offense, the dicta cited above indicated the court's
concern for the plight of nonperpetrators who had failed to report crimes on their
property. Id.
2 Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993) (concluding that
"forfeiture under these provisions constitutes 'payment to a sovereign as
punishment for some offense,' and-as such, is subject to the limitations of the
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however, resolve the plight of the nonperpetrating owner, because
it split 5-4 over the appropriate legal approach for determining
when forfeiture was excessive.22 In a separate concurrence, Justice
Antonin Scalia argued forcefully that lower courts should be
required to follow an instrumentality approach,2 3 which focuses on
the relationship between the property and the offense.24 For its
part, the majority refused to adopt an excessiveness test based
solely on instrumentality, opting instead to allow the lower courts
to use whatever factors they considered appropriate,25 including
elements of proportionality.26 Thus, lacking a clear mandate or
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause") (citations omitted).
22 In Austin, the majority included Justices Henry Blackmun, Byron White,
John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor and David Souter. Justice Anthony
Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in
which Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas joined.
Justice Antonin Scalia filed a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring
in the opinion. Id. at 2802.
23 "Instrumentality" is defined as "[s]omething by which an end is achieved;
a means, medium, agency." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 801 (6th ed. 1990).
Within the civil forfeiture context, the term derives from the in rem nature of the
forfeiture action. An instrumentality inquiry determines whether the relationship
between the property and the offense is close enough to permit forfeiture. Austin,
113 S. Ct. at 2812 (Scalia, J., concurring).
24 Austin, 113 S. Ct. 2814 (Scalia, J., concurring).
25 Id. at 2812 n.15. In Austin, the claimant argued that the Court should
adopt a "multifactor" test for determining excessiveness. Id at 2812. In his
concurrence, Justice Scalia argued that lower courts should judge excessiveness
only in terms of how instrumental the property was to the illegal activity, that
is, how important the property was to the commission of the underlying crime.
Id. at 2812 (Scalia, J., concurring). In a separate concurrence, Justices Kennedy,
Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated their agreement with Justice
Scalia's instrumentalist approach. Id. at 2815 (Kennedy, J., concurring). While
the majority did not "rule out the possibility that the connection between the
property and the offense may be relevant," the Court refused to limit lower
courts "from considering other factors in determining whether the forfeiture of
[the claimant's] property was excessive." Id. at 2812 n.15. Nor did the Court
choose to enumerate these possible factors.
26 "Proportionality" is defined as a "relationship of equivalence between two
pairs of quantities, such that the first bears the same relationship to the second
as the third does to the fourth." NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
2381 (4th ed. 1993). The legal concept of proportionality stems from the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause jurisprudence, where the
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articulated test, lower courts have been forced to fashion their own
excessiveness tests, using either instrumentality, proportionality, or
a synthesis of the two approaches.
27
Supreme Court has articulated the concept as "[t]he principle that a punishment
should be proportionate to the crime." Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3006
(1983).
In addition to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Court has
applied a proportionality analysis to the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Bail
Clause, reading "excessive" to require proportionality between the amount of bail
and the Government's interest in preventing the defendant's flight. United States
v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2105 (1987); see also supra note 14 (quoting the
Excessive Bail Clause).
Applying the Excessive Fines Clause to civil forfeiture, federal courts have
articulated proportionality as comparing "the nature of the offense with the
harshness, monetary or otherwise, of the forfeiture." United States v. 6380 Little
Canyon Road, 59 F.3d 974, 983 (9th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. RR#1,
14 F.3d 864, 874-75 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845
F. Supp. 725, 732-33 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
This Note distinguishes two approaches to proportionality. The first
approach defines "harshness" of the forfeiture solely in terms of the monetary
value of the property. The second holds a broader definition of harshness,
including the hardship forfeiture would create on the owner and innocent third
parties. See infra text accompanying notes 104-11 and 125-44 (comparing prop-
ortionality approach based exclusively on monetary terms against multifactor
proportionality).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 1994)
(adopting an instrumentality approach to forfeiture).
For a review of the monetary proportionality approach, see United States v.
429 S. Main Street, 52 F.3d 1416, 1422 (6th Cir. 1995) (affirming forfeiture of
home using purely monetary proportionality approach); United States v. 143-147
East 23rd Street, 888 F.Supp. 580, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that forfeiture
of hotel owner's equity interest of $500,000.00 was not excessive when
maximum fine against perpetrator was roughly equivalent to owner's equity
interest) (holding forfeiture also excessive under Milbrandmultifactor test), aft'd,
77 F.3d 648 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. 2408 Parliament, 859 F. Supp.
1075, 1078 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that forfeiture of an $87,000.00 residence
was not excessive when claimant could have received 2 million dollars in federal
fines); United States v. 11869 Westshore Drive, 848 F. Supp. 107, 111 (E.D.
Mich. 1994) (holding that forfeiture of a $85,000.00 home was not excessive
when claimant could have received $250,000.00 in fines), aff'd, 70 F.3d 923, 930
(6th Cir. 1995).
Cases involving courts' use of multifactor tests include United States v.
G.P.S. Automotive Corp., 66 F.3d 483, 501 (2d Cir. 1995) (remanding case with
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This Note examines an innovative attempt by the Second
Circuit to create such a synthesis. In United States v Milbrand,28
the Second Circuit became the first federal court to approach
excessiveness by drawing a legal distinction between owners who
committed the underlying offense by possessing or selling drugs on
their property, and owners who were nonperpetrators.29 Part I of
this Note provides a brief procedural history of Milbrand, and
examines the two separate tests adopted by the Second Circuit. Part
II traces the origins of Milbrand concepts and language by
analyzing recent Supreme Court decisions in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, particularly the seminal debate over proportionality
and instrumentality in Austin. Part III surveys the year and a half
of federal caselaw between Austin and Milbrand, a period in which
the federal circuits have divided into three loose camps.3° This
section also critiques each of these approaches, and suggests that
the Milbrand dichotomy represents the most equitable approach for
nonperpetrators.
Part IV assesses Milbrand and argues three main points. First,
by drawing the distinction between perpetrators and nonperpe-
trators, the Second Circuit has given claimants a greater opportunity
to fight off excessive forfeiture in lower courts. Second, through its
instructions that the lower court make multifactor determination of forfeiture's
constitutionality, including level of owner's culpability); United States v. 9638
Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d 327, 330 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing forfeiture on other
grounds, while being highly critical of strict instrumentality approach); RR # 1,
14 F.3d at 872-76 (remanding forfeiture action for factual determination of
excessiveness, and encouraging lower court to consider other factors besides
instrumentality); Zumirez, 845 F. Supp. at 731-38 (developing multifactortest for
determining excessiveness).
28 58 F.3d 841, 848 (2d Cir. 1995).
29 In mentioning a previous Second Circuit case applying excessive fines
analysis to a perpetrating owner, the court noted that the "excessiveness inquiry
should involve analysis of the amount of the penalty in light of the extensiveness
of the convicted owner's criminal activities." Id. at 847. In the case at bar,
however, where the claimant was "not the perpetrator of the crime," the court
opined that this new situation required "analysis of the amount of penalty in light
of the role and culpability of the [non-perpetrating] owner in the illicit use of her
property." Id. at 848.
30 See infra part IIIA-D (describing three basic approaches to excessiveness
for forfeitures of real property).
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nonperpetrator test, the Milbrand court has done a better job than
most courts thus far in synthesizing elements of instrumentality and
proportionality, and producing an articulated test that lower courts
can apply fairly. However, this Note also argues that by holding on
mechanistically to language of precedent that is unsuitable for civil
forfeiture, the Milbrand court unfairly taints its nonperpetrator test
with the culpability of the criminal offender who committed the
underlying offense.
Part V examines United States v 6380 Little Canyon Road,3
a Ninth Circuit case decided a month after Milbrand, which offers
a procedural solution that would improve the Milbrand nonperpe-
trator test by clearly separating its instrumentality and proportion-
ality elements, making it even easier for lower courts to apply
fairly. Part VI concludes that the other federal circuits should adopt
the Milbrand perpetrator-nonperpetrator distinction, as well as other
innovations like the procedural approach adopted by Little Canyon
Road. In its final analysis, this Note differs from other commen-
tary" in its assertion that by recognizing the distinction between
59 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1995).
32 Other commentators have spent considerable length in analyzing Austin
and its place within the history of civil forfeiture law. Several of these
commentators have developed their own remedial solutions. One author eschews
the present crisis in governmental abuse and supports Justice Scalia's instrumen-
tality approach based on the "historical fiction" of in rem forfeiture actions. Joy
Chatman, Note, Losing the Battle, But Not the War: The Future Use of Civil
Forfeiture by Law Enforcement Agencies After Austin v. United States, 38 St.
Louis U. L.J. 739, 740 (1994). Other writers prescribe a variety of methods for
introducing proportionality concepts to the law. One author proposes a blanket
forfeiture statute that would eliminate the "historical fiction" of the defendant
property. Stacy J. Pollock, Note, Proportionality in Civil Forfeiture: Toward a
Remedial Solution, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 194, 197 (1994). Another author
prescribes a set of specific factors that courts should use in determining
forfeiture. Andrew S. Williams, Comment, Austin v. United States: Illusory
Protection Against In Rem Civil Forfeiture Actions?, 24 SW. U. L. REV. 251,
256 (1994). All of these approaches propose impractical solutions, however,
because they are each divorced from the present trend of courts to blend various
factors into a multifactor approach.
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perpetrators and nonperpetrators, courts can better develop
excessive fines analyses that are logically consistent and just.33
I. UNITED STATES V. MILBRAND
34
A. Facts and Procedure
In August 1990, police raided an eighty-five-acre farm in
western New York.35 Patrolled by guard dogs, they found several
fields of marijuana, totaling 1362 plants on or near the property. 36
3' This Note does not, however, argue that there is a clear moral distinction
between perpetrators and nonperpetrators in forfeiture actions. Indeed, a review
of relevant caselaw indicates that nonperpetrating owners may sometimes hold
more culpability than those who have committed an underlying crime. See, e.g.,
United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding mother at least
willfully blind of son's massive marijuana production). Cf United States v. 429
S. Main Street, 52 F.3d 1416 (6th Cir. 1995) (affirming forfeiture of home where
owner sold small amounts of marijuana, but did not instigate sale in home);
United States v. 835 Seventh Street, 820 F. Supp. 688 (N.D.N.Y. 1992)
(rejecting forfeiture where claimant sold only a few small bags of marijuana to
undercover agents, who suggested that the transaction take place inside claimant's
home).
The underlying assumption of this Note, however, is that the present legal
structure of civil forfeitures for drug offenses is so prone to abuse that it should
be dismantled and subsumed into criminal forfeiture law, where seizures of
property must be based upon a higher level of proof than mere probable cause.
See Cheh, supra note 13, at 1360 (arguing that sanctions should be criminal only
if they are "formally intended to be and [are] denominated as such" by the
legislature); see also Maveal, supra note 13, at 661 (1995) (arguing that "civil
forfeiture, with its archaic fictions.., has not yet become an anachronism, but
it is likely that the government effectively will be required either to join its
forfeiture claim in a criminal indictment or elect between remedies of civil
forfeiture and criminal conviction").
Considering the present conservative cast of American politics, the chief
avenue of reform will continue to be the courts, especially through Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. To that end, it will be important for claimants to
introduce into district courts, through defenses of nonperpetrating parties, the
concepts that the Milbrand court has adopted for the Second Circuit.
14 58 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1995).
" Id. at 842-43. The farm was located in Pembroke, New York. Id.
36 Id. at 843.
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Law enforcement agents also discovered small plots of marijuana
plants of various sizes located throughout the farm,37 and found a
barn with 183 harvested marijuana plants hanging to dry.38 Inside
Mark Milbrand's farmhouse, police found more marijuana,
paraphernalia and seeds separated and labeled by year, size, quality
and height, as well as a loaded gun.39
This was the second time that Marcia Milbrand's son had been
arrested for growing marijuana.4" In 1980, while Mark was living
with her at her home, police executed a search warrant and
discovered 1000 containers of seeds in her garage, marijuana plants
and plant lights in her basement, and in Mark's bedroom, "in plain
view, marijuana, marijuana packaging material, scales, photographs
of Mark standing next to tall marijuana plants, and books on
growing marijuana."'"
Ten years later, the district court in the 1990 civil forfeiture
action heard testimony that after the farm was raided, Marcia
Milbrand told an agent that she was aware that Mark had a
"problem with marijuana" and that they had "built the farm so that
Mark would have a place to do his farming."42 The district court
ruled for the government in forfeiting the eighty-five-acre tract and
farmhouse, determined that Marcia Milbrand's innocent owner
defense was unbelievable,43 and rejected her excessive fines
defense44 because Mark had "used the entirety of the property to
further his advanced drug enterprise."45
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 843, 848.
40 Id. at 843.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Marcia Milbrand admitted in testimony that when she went to the house
once a week to clean, she went into drawers and cabinets where the police later
discovered contraband and drug paraphernalia. Id. at 843, 848. The district court
also found her "demeanor indicated that she was shading the truth on certain
matters." Id. at 843.
44 Id. The court did not articulate Marcia Milbrand's rationale behind her
excessive fines defense.
41 Id. at 844 (emphasis added).
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B. The Second Circuit's Analysis
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in July
1995, and adopted two separate tests for determining excessiveness
under the Eighth Amendment. For perpetrators, the Milbrand court
created a nexus text which considers forfeitures in light of:
the nexus between the offense and property and the extent
of the property's role in the offense [including] whether
the use of the property in the offense was deliberate and
planned or merely incidental and fortuitous; whether the
property was important to the success of the illegal
activity; the time during which the property was illegally
used and the spatial extent of its use; whether its illegal use
was an isolated event or had been repeated; and whether
the purpose of acquiring, maintaining or using the property
was to carry out the offense.46
In addition to the nexus requirement, the Milbrand court included
two other elements in its perpetrator test: "the role and culpability
of the owner,, 47 and "the possibility of separating offending
property that can readily be separated from the remainder."'48
Recognizing that Marcia Milbrand was a nonperpetrating owner,
however, the Second Circuit developed a separate test for her class
of claimants.49 Lower courts would now consider nonperpetrator
defenses in light of:
(1) the harshness of the forfeiture (e.g., the nature and
value of the property and the effect of forfeiture on
innocent third parties) in comparison to (a) the gravity of
the offense, and (b) the sentence that could be imposed on
the perpetrator of such an offense; (2) the relationship
between the property and the offense, including whether
use of the property in the offense was (a) important to the
46 Id. at 846.
47 Id.
48 Id.
41 See infra Figure 1 (illustrating the separate tests developed for perpetrator
and nonperpetrator owners).
769
JOURNAL OF LA W AND POLICY
success of the illegal activity, (b) deliberate and planned or
merely incidental and fortuitous, and (c) temporally or
spatially extensive; and (3) the role and degree of culpabil-
ity of the owner of the property."
Figure 1 illustrates the perpetrator/nonperpetrator distinction by
the Second Circuit:
Figure 1
Milbrand's Two Excessive Fines Tests
Perpetrator Test Non-Perpetrator Test
1. Nexus between 1. Harshness of Forfeiture vs.
Property and the Offense Gravity of the Offense and
Possible Sentence Imposed
2. Role and Culpability of on Perpetrator
the Owner
2. Relationship between
3. Possibility of Separating Property and the Offense
Offending Property from the
Remainder 3. Role and Degree of
Culpability of the Owner
In determining the harshness of forfeiture in this case, the
Milbrand court judged the property's worth at roughly
$66,000.00." However, the court counterbalanced this monetary
harshness against the gravity of Mark's offense. This offense was
deemed severe, because the possible sentence under a federal
criminal prosecution could have included a fine of at least two
million dollars.52
Under the second part of the nonperpetrator test, the court
found that the relationship between the property and the marijuana
production was integral considering the extent to which it was
spread across the entire farm.5 3 Finally, under the culpability factor
'o Milbrand, 58 F.3d. at 847-48.
"' Id. at 848.
52 Id.




of the Milbrand test, the court found that the owner's role indicated
"a significant degree of culpability in the criminal use of the
property.' 5 4 The court therefore ruled that the forfeiture was not
constitutionally excessive, implying that none of the indicia of
excessiveness it included in its new nonperpetrator test were present
in Marcia Milbrand's case.55
II. THE ORIGINS OF MLBRAND
A. Pre-Austin Crisis
To understand the legal plight of nonperpetrating owners like
Marcia Milbrand, it is necessary to appreciate the mechanics of the
Controlled Substances Act,56 the law applied in the Milbrand
case.57 In its goal to win the "war on drugs,"58 Congress has
attached powerful substantive and procedural weapons to this
federal forfeiture statute. For example, in a federal civil forfeiture
action the government need only show a low threshold of drug
activity before it can seize the property,59 and the property must
merely "facilitate" criminal conduct enough to form a "nexus" with
the drug activity.6° In addition, because the Controlled Substances
14 Milbrand, 58 F.3d. at 848.
55 1d.
56 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-950.
57 Milbrand, 58 F.3d at 842.
58 In addition to developing the procedural and substantive mechanics of
anti-drug provisions in the Controlled Substances Act, Congress and state
legislatures have instituted mandatory sentences for nonviolent drug offenses that
vastly surpass previous sentencing for similar offenses. See UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 5-15 (1991).
'9 See supra note 13 (comparing civil and criminal forfeiture, and noting that
in a civil action the government need only show probable cause of criminal
conduct before seizing the property).
60 United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 733 (C.D. Cal.
1994) (noting that "[p]robable cause for a civil forfeiture is comparatively easy
for the government to establish").
The federal circuits disagree over whether § 881 (a)(7) requires a "substantial
connection" between the offense and the property, or whether there should
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Act is governed procedurally by admiralty and maritime rules,6' the
government must only demonstrate by probable cause that a
"nexus" of drug activity has occurred before seizing the prop-
erty.62 The burden of proof then shifts to the property owner, who
must demonstrate by a higher standard, preponderance of the
evidence, that either the property is free of criminal taint or that the
owner was unaware of the alleged criminal activity.
63
merely exist a "nexus," where the government need only demonstrate that illegal
activity on the property is more than incidental and fortuitous. For a survey of
courts following the "substantial connection" approach, see United States v. Rural
Route 1, 24 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. 2204 Barbara Lane,
960 F.2d 126, 129 (1 1th Cir. 1992); United States v. 28 Emery Street, 914 F.2d
1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1990). For the "nexus" approach, see United States v. RR #1,
14 F.3d 864, 868-69 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. 785 Nicholas Ave., 983
F.2d 396, 403 (2d Cir. 1992). Neither statutory interpretation, however, has
curbed the flood of successful forfeiture actions. See infra note 64 and
accompanying text.
61 21 U.S.C. § 881 (b) ("Any property subject to civil forfeiture to the United
States under this subchapter may be seized by the Attorney General upon process
issued pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime
Claims by any district court of the United States having jurisdiction over the
property. . . .") (exceptions omitted).
62 See Michael F. Alessio, Comment, From Exodus to Embarrassment: Civil
Forfeiture Under the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 48 SMU L. REV.
429, 437 (1995) ("This burden has been articulated as 'less than prima facie
proof but more than mere suspicion,' and has been characterized as the 'lowest
[burden] in any American courtroom."') (citing, inter alia, United States v.
Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1160 n.7 (2d Cir. 1986)).
63 For a general discussion of probable cause in civil forfeiture, see United
States v. 429 S. Main Street, 843 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Ohio 1993); aff'd, 52 F.3d
1416 (6th Cir. 1995). In 429 S. Main Street, the court noted that:
[t]he procedures for forfeiture under the customs laws apply to
forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. § 881. The burden of proof in forfeiture
cases is found in 19 U.S.C. § 1615. The burden is initially on the
government to show probable cause to believe that the criminal activity
occurred, as well as probable cause to believe that there is a nexus
between the property and the criminal activity. Probable cause is
defined as a reasonable ground for belief of guilt supported by less
than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion. Probable cause
is a question of law for the court.
Once probable cause is shown, the burden then shifts to the
claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property
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Consequently, civil forfeiture has amounted to a lucrative
operation for the federal government, with billions of dollars in
property seized.64 Commentators have noted many "horror stories"
of grossly disproportionate forfeitures. 65 There also have been
is not subject to forfeiture. Where the government has demonstrated
probable cause in an action under § 881 (a)(7), the burden shifts to the
claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property
was not used to commit or facilitate the commission of an offense
under Title 21. Summary judgment may be appropriate where a
claimant fails to show that the facts constituting probable cause did not
actually exist.
Id. at 340 (citations omitted).
64 David Heilbroner, The Law Goes on a Treasure Hunt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
11, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 70. From 1984 to 1994, there were over 200,000
federal forfeitures, resulting in $3.6 billion in added revenue. Id. The Justice
Department estimates that $1.7 billion more is "in the pipeline." Id.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the federal government has
developed a "financial stake" in drug forfeitures, "apparent from a 1990 memo,
in which the Attorney General urged United States Attorneys to increase the
volume of forfeitures in order to meet the Department of Justice's annual budget
target." United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 502
n.2 (1993) (emphasis added).
6 See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, Can Something This Easy, Quick, and Profitable
Also Be Fair? Runaway Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution, 39 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 1 (1994). The following are examples of grossly disproportionate
forfeitures:
In South Dakota, a couple permitted a friend to visit, knowing he
possessed thirty-nine marijuana seedlings. After the friend left with the
seedlings, the police searched the premises and found a trace of
marijuana and a marijuana butt in a car belonging to the couple's
daughter. The police seized the house.
Id. at 4.
"A detective combing through old arrest reports on Maui, Hawaii, found an
overlooked opportunity for a seizure and confiscated a family's house because
a son had grown marijuana there four years earlier." Heilbroner, supra note 64,
at 70.
One civil forfeiture of real property involved only two phone calls from the
defendant's premises:
On February 20, 1986, Paul F. Born III, gave his home telephone
number to John Mueller, an undercover law enforcement official,
during the discussion of a drug transaction. Mueller called Born twice,
and they agreed that Born would sell two ounces of cocaine to Mueller
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indications that the relative ease with which forfeiture actions can
be brought has led to governmental hubris and a corresponding
abuse of discretion.66 It is not surprising then that the Supreme
Court has curbed governmental power in this area, not only by
applying the Eighth Amendment, but also by finding abuses of the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process 67 and Double Jeopardy Clauses6
as well.69
for $3200. Born was not present when the transaction took place at a
local bar, but he was convicted of federal criminal narcotics violations.
The United States then instituted a civil action under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(7) to forfeit Born's one-third interest in his house. The
government offered Bor's parents, who owned the remaining
two-thirds interest in the house, a chance to purchase Born's interest
or receive two-thirds of the proceeds from a forfeiture sale. The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the forfeiture action.
Douglas S. Reinhart, Note, Applying the Eighth Amendment to Civil Forfeiture
After Austin v. the United States: Excessiveness and Proportionality, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 235, 236 (1994) (citing United States v. 916 Douglas Avenue,
903 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991)).
66 For example, in United States v. The North 907.5 Feet of the N.E.
Quarter, 999 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1993), the government had plea bargained a
married couple to not contest their convictions and two pending civil forfeiture
claims against their land, home and vehicle, in exchange for a promise that the
government would institute no more "proceedings" against them. Id. at 1265
(Beam, J., dissenting). After this deal, the government instituted a third forfeiture
action, against land abutting the couple's old property. Id. (Beam, J., dissenting).
The district court dismissed the action, claiming the government had violated
their "contract" with the couple. Id. at 1264-65. The Eight Circuit reversed,
holding that in rem forfeitures are directed against the property, not against the
owners, and therefore the government had not technically broken their pledge.
Id. at 1265.
67 The Due Process Clause states that citizens will not "be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6 The Double Jeopardy Clause states: "nor shall any person be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . " U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
69 See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (finding that
civil forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and 881(a)(7) are punitive and
subject to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment); United States
v. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993) (holding that criminal RICO forfeitures are
subject to Eighth Amendment); United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993) (holding that lower courts must provide
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B. The Whalers Cove Proportionality Analysis
The language and concepts that helped create Milbrand
nonperpetrating test emanated from dicta in a 1992 Second Circuit
opinion which suggested that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive
Fines Clause may be applicable to civil forfeitures.70 In United
States v 38 Whalers Cove Drive,7' the Second Circuit surmised
that "[w]here the seized property is not itself an instrumentality of
crime ... [and] its total value is overwhelmingly disproportionate
to the value of controlled substances involved in the statutory
violation, there is a rebuttable presumption that the forfeiture is
claimants with notice and hearing before issuing judgment of civil forfeiture);
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993) (holding that the
innocent owner defense is not limited to bona fide purchasers for value, and
should include any person with any interest in the property, whether legal or
equitable, and can also include innocent owners who acquired the property after
the commission of illegal acts). But see Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 999
(1996) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not protect against forfeiture
of family car when state indecency law does not include innocent owner
defense).
70 "We are guided in part, however, by United States v. 38 Whalers Cove
Drive .... Whalers Cove was a pre-Austin case in which we considered the
Eighth Amendment contentions of an owner convicted in state court of the
narcotics offenses on which the forfeiture was based." United States v. Milbrand,
58 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
In a recent decision that remanded a district court's ruling for the federal
government because the lower court did not properly consider an Excessive Fines
Clause defense, Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Guido Calabresi wrote
that Austin "vindicated our analysis in Whalers Cove." United States v. G.P.S.
Automotive Corp., 66 F.3d 483, 500 (2d Cir. 1995). See also United States v.
143-147 East 23rd Street, 888 F.Supp. 580, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (employing
Whalers Cove analysis in forfeiture of hotel owner's equity interest) aff'd, 77
F.3d 648 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding forfeiture also excessive under Milbrand
multifactor test).
71 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992). In Whalers
Cove, the government brought a § 88 l(a)(7) forfeiture action against the home
of a man who had sold two and a half grams of cocaine to an undercover agent
inside his home. Id at 32. The district court granted summary judgment for the
government. Id. The Second Circuit affirmed. Id at 39.
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punitive in nature."72 The court did not explain whether "instru-
mentality of crime" meant anything other than the easy "nexus"
standard prescribed by 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(7), 7 nor did the court
speculate that the "value" of the property meant anything other than
its monetary worth (e.g. whether it was a residence, whether it
housed innocent third parties like children, etc.).74 Although the
Whalers Cove court did not explicitly argue that an Eighth
Amendment analysis was appropriate, it nevertheless performed a
proportionality analysis and determined that the forfeiture would be
constitutional.75
In performing its Eighth Amendment analysis, the Whalers
Cove court errantly incorporated language of Solem v Helm,76 a
1983 Supreme Court decision that applied the Eighth Amendment's
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to a prison sentence.77 In
determining whether the defendant in Solem had received a
constitutionally cruel and unusual punishment, the Supreme Court
defined proportionality as a balancing test between the harshness of
the defendant's penalty, the gravity of his offense, and comparative
sentencing in his jurisdiction and in similar jurisdictions. 78 There-
72 Whalers Cove, 954 F.2d at 36.
7 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
4 Whalers Cove, 954 F.2d at 39 (stating that "we infer from the statutes that
the imposition of the equivalent of a $68,000.00 fine [the monetary value of the
residence] ... while large, is not a grossly disproportionate punishment within
the meaning of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence").
71 Id. at 38-39.
76 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
17 In Solem, the trial court employed a state recidivist statute to sentence the
defendant to life imprisonment without parole for writing a "no account" check,
a nonviolent offense that ordinarily would have brought a maximum punishment
of five years' imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Id. at 281. The federal district
court denied a petition for writ of habeas corpus, but the Eighth Circuit reversed
and remanded. Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1982). The Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that despite the defendant's previous offenses, the severe
sentence was disproportionate to the petty crime. Solem, 463 U.S. at 304.
7 The specific language of the Solem test was "the gravity of the offense
and the harshness of the penalty ... the sentences imposed on other criminals
in the same jurisdiction ... [and] the sentences imposed for commission of the
same crime in other jurisdictions." Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-92.
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fore, the Solem Court focused heavily on sentencing to determine
whether the defendant's length of incarceration was unconsti-
tutional. Whalers Cove relied on this sentencing emphasis even
though as a civil case it did not pertain to sentencing as did the
underlying facts in Solem.79
Figure 2 illustrates the influence of Solem's language upon
Whalers Cove:
Figure 2
Cruel & Unusual Excessive Fines:
Punishment: Sentencing Civil Forfeiture
SOLEM WHALERS COVE
1. Harshness of the Penalty 1. Value of the Property vs.
vs. Gravity of the Offense Gravity of the Offense
2. Sentences in Same 2. Sentences in Same
Jurisdiction for Similar Crimes Jurisdiction for Similar Crimes
3. Other Jurisdictions' 3. Other Jurisdictions'
Sentences for the Same Crime Sentences for the Same Crime
In addition, in weighing "sentences imposed," the Whalers Cove
court failed to consider the actual criminal sentence and fine of the
property owner, but instead looked at the maximum amount the
owner could be fined under federal and state law.80 Consequently,
Solem was narrowed substantially in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957
(1991), where a plurality of the Court upheld a mandatory life sentence for a
first-time offender for possession of 672 grams of cocaine. In addition, Justice
Scalia was joined by four other Justices in maintaining that proportionality
review was inappropriate for criminal sentences other than death. Id at 994-96.
'9 The Whalers Cove test considered three factors: (1) the value of the
property versus the inherent gravity of the offense; (2) the sentence imposed for
similarly grave offenses in the same jurisdiction; and (3) sentences imposed for
the same crime in other jurisdictions. Whalers Cove, 954 F.2d at 38.
'0 Id. at 39 ("Federal law authorizes a sentence of twenty years and a fine
of $1,000,000.00 for the distribution of cocaine in an amount less than 500
grams.... Under New York law, a defendant who had distributed the same
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Whalers Cove resulted in a harsh decision: the defendant lost the
$68,000.00 equity in his condominium because of two sales totaling
two and a half grams of cocaine to a confidential informant who
suggested at the first sale that the transaction occur in the defen-
dant's home.8'
C. The Austin Decision
Despite this rather modest beginning at applying the Eighth
Amendment to civil forfeiture, the Supreme Court chose to review
the issue less than a year after Whalers Cove. Although not
articulated as such, the Court's rapid response may have been due
to the deluge of governmental forfeiture actions after Congress
amended the Controlled Substances Act to include section
881(a)(7), 83 and the subsequent need to curb a decade of "prosecu-
torial zeal., 8 4 As a result, in Austin all nine Justices agreed that
forfeitures under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) constituted punishment
quantity of cocaine as [the claimant] would be exposed to 8 years and 4 months
imprisonment and $50,000.00 in fines.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
8 Id. at 32. The court also did not include the claimant's culpability as a
factor, even though the undercover agent induced him into using his home to
facilitate the crime. Id.
Courts are generally silent on use of "entrapment" issue as a factor in owner
culpability. However, one Sixth Circuit judge has voiced discontent at such
governmental tactics within the civil forfeiture context. United States v. 429 S.
Main Street, 52 F.3d 1416, 1423 (6th Cir. 1995) (Guy, J., dissenting).
"Entrapment" is defined as an instance when a law enforcement agent or
confidential informant "originates the idea of the crime and then induces another
person to engage in conduct constituting such a crime when the other person is
not otherwise disposed to do so." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 532 (6th ed. 1990).
82 "We granted certiorari to resolve an apparent conflict with the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit over the applicability of the Eighth Amendment
to in rem civil forfeitures." Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2803
(1993).
83 See supra note 64 (noting 200,000 forfeiture actions in a recent 10 year
period).
84 In re Assets of Martin, I F.3d 1351, 1360 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Further, the
Supreme Court's application of Eighth Amendment limitations to forfeitures




and were subject to the restraints of the Excessive Fines Clause. 5
Despite their unanimity in the judgment, the Justices disagreed on
how to define excessiveness in the context of civil forfeiture,
leading to a diversity of opinion among lower courts about the
meaning of Austin.
Concurring Justice Scalia86  espoused an instrumentality
analysis that has become somewhat influential among federal circuit
and district courts,87 and helped inspire many of the elements of
both tests developed in Milbrand. Justice Scalia argued that an
Eighth Amendment analysis should not rest upon the gravity of the
underlying offense or the value of the property at issue, but instead
should turn on the extent that the property was instrumental in the
execution of the crime:
[I]n rem forfeitures have traditionally been fixed, not by
determining the appropriate value of the penalty or the
penalty in relation to the committed offense, but by
determining what property has been "tainted" by unlawful
use, to which issue the value of the property is irrelevant
... The question is not how much the confiscated
property is worth, but whether the confiscated property has
a close enough relationship to the offense.88
While Justice Scalia emphasized the historical roots of his instru-
mentality approach,89 the true attraction of his approach to lower
85 Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
Section 881(a)(4) provides that the federal government shall forfeit "[a]ll
conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation,
sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property . . . ." 21 U.S.C.
§ 88 1(a)(4). Section 881(a)(4) represents the personal property counterpart to the
real property provision in § 881(a)(7). See supra note 18.
86 Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 (Scalia, J., concurring).
87 See United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1995) (adopting
instrumentality approach for claimants who perpetrated underlying offense);
United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1994) (adopting Justice Scalia's
instrumentality approach in Austin); United States v. 9638 Chicago Heights, 831
F. Supp. 736 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (applying pure instrumentality approach), rev'd
on other grounds, 27 F.3d 327 (8th Cir. 1994).
88 Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
89 "A prominent 19th-century treatise explains statutory in rem forfeitures
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courts, however, is not its historical pedigree, but the simple and
precise manner in which it can be applied.9" The instrumentality
approach more closely resembles the statutory "nexus" requirement
in the forfeiture provision of the Controlled Substances Act,91 and
ostensibly prevents judges from applying "their personal notions of
propriety to civil forfeiture proceedings." 92
While Justice Scalia's instrumentality approach may have some
applicability in determining the excessiveness of forfeiture, the
Austin majority's analysis better explains the reality of the impact
that federal forfeiture laws have made on society. The majority
circumvented the "historical fiction" of in rem forfeiture by arguing
that the underlying pretext of forfeiture rested "at bottom, on the
notion that the owner has been negligent in allowing his property
to be misused and that he is properly punished for that negli-
gence."93 The majority bolstered its argument by pointing out that
Congress had included an innocent owner defense in both
§§ 881(a)(4) and 881(a)(7), and thereby implied as a corollary that
solely by reference to the fiction that the property is guilty." Id. at 2814 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
90 In Chandler, the Fourth Circuit illustrated the instrumentality approach's
efficacy through the use of two hypotheticals:
Forfeiture of a $14 million yacht, specially outfitted with high-powered
motors, radar, and secret compartments for the sole purpose of
transporting drugs from a foreign country into the United States, would
probably offend no one's sense of excessiveness, even though the
property has such a high value. On the other hand, forfeiture of a row
house, which is owned by an elderly woman and which shelters her
children and grandchildren, upon discovery of a trace amount of
cocaine in a grandson's room, might arguably be found to be exces-
sive, even though the house has a relatively low value of $30,000.00.
In both cases, the intuitive excessiveness analysis centers on the
relationship between the property and the offense-the more incidental
or fortuitous the involvement of the property in the offense, the
stronger the argument that its forfeiture is excessive.
Chandler, 36 F.3d at 364.
"' The Chandler court noted that "Congress... did not intend to punish or
fine by a particular amount or value; instead, it intended to punish by forfeiting
property of whatever value which was tainted by the offense." Id.
92 Id. at 368 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
9 Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2808.
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the statute punishes owner culpability.94 Many courts have since
logically extended this argument to conclude that an important part
of the excessive fines inquiry is whether the government's
punishment (forfeiture) is proportional to the owner's culpa-
bility.95 However, the Court declined to fashion a multifactor test
that would include both elements of instrumentality and proportion-
ality, and elected instead to allow lower courts the opportunity to
review these cases in the first instance, and bring in "other
factors."96
The contributions of federal jurisprudence to Milbrand therefore
include: 1) the Solem test as seen through the simplistic lens of
Whalers Cove;97 2) Justice Scalia's concurrence in Austin which
was openly hostile to proportionality concepts;9" and 3) a tentative
Austin majority that implicitly suggested partial application of
proportionality, but did not demand it.99







Instrumentality Multifactor SIml lstic
Approach Approach Proportionality
94 Id. at 2810.
9' United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Road, 59 F.3d 974, 983 (9th Cir.
1995); United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1995); United States
v. 9638 Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d 327, 330-31 (8th Cir. 1994).
96 Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 n.15. The Court did not enumerate what these
"other factors" were.
97 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
98 See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text (evaluating the instrumen-
tality approach).
99 See supra text accompanying note 96.
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While the majority refused to articulate a test in the case of a
convicted drug dealer, Austin's mandate regarding nonperpetrating
claimants was even less clear. The role of lower courts, therefore,
has proven integral in developing Milbrand nonperpetrator
test. 100
III. THE FEDERAL LANDSCAPE SINCE AUSTIN
Federal courts have taken three basic approaches to civil
forfeiture since the Austin majority granted them the power to
fashion their own inquiries on excessiveness. A few courts have
chosen a Whalers Cove-style proportionality approach, where they
have simply determined the monetary value of the property and
compared that to the possible criminal penalties a defendant could
incur for an underlying offense.'l ' Other courts have embraced
0'0 As an interesting epilogue to a discussion of the Supreme Court's position
on civil forfeiture, consider Justice Kennedy's comment on nonperpetrators in his
Austin concurrence:
At some point, we may have to confront the constitutional question
whether forfeiture is permitted when the owner has committed no
wrong of any sort, intentional or negligent. That for me would raise a
serious question. Though the history of forfeiture laws might not be
determinative of that issue, it would have an important bearing on the
outcome.
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2815 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Assuming
that Justice Kennedy did not overlook the fact that the underlying civil forfeiture
statute in Austin included an innocent owner defense, the "constitutional
question" to which he is referring is not apparent. One strong possibility,
however, is that Justice Kennedy considers an owner's "mere awareness" of
criminal activity not to be a "wrong" of any sort. An example of this possibility
would be an owner who is dominated by the perpetrator of the underlying
offense, as a battered wife would be by a dominating husband. Since Justice
Kennedy along with joining Justices Rehnquist and Thomas agree with part I of
Justice Scalia's concurrence, they support a general instrumentalist analysis of
forfeiture excessiveness. This isolated comment, however, in the final paragraph
of the concurrence, may lend support to the notion that forfeitures against
nonperpetrators are somehow "different" and should be subject to a multifactor
approach.
'o' See, e.g., United States v. 143-147 East 23rd Street, 888 F.Supp. 580,
584 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that forfeiture of hotel owner's equity of
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Justice Scalia's instrumentality approach, although they invariably
include concepts of proportionality in their enunciated tests.
0 2
Most circuits, however, have adopted a multifactor approach that
combines instrumentality concepts with a broader view of pro-
portionality, and incorporates such extraneous factors as whether
the property is a residence or whether innocent parties might be
affected by forfeiture.' °3 The following sections will examine
these three approaches.
$500,000.00 was not excessive when maximum fine against perpetrator was
roughly equivalent to owner's equity interest), aff'd, 77 F.3d 648 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding forfeiture also excessive under Milbrand multifactor test); United States
v. 2408 Parliament, 859 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that
forfeiture of an $87,000.00 residence was not excessive when claimant could
have received two million dollars in federal fines); United States v. 11869
Westshore Drive, 848 F. Supp. 107, 111 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that
forfeiture of a $105,000.00 home was not excessive when claimant could have
received $250,000.00 in fines) aff'd, 70 F.3d 923, 930 (6th Cir. 1995); United
States v. 429 S. Main Street, 843 F. Supp. 337, 342 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (holding
that forfeiture of $83,700.00 residence is not excessive when claimant could have
received $500,000.00 in federal fines), aff'd, 52 F.3d 1416 (6th Cir. 1995).
0'2 For example, in Chandler, the Fourth Circuit indicated that proportion-
ality considerations might be appropriate for nonperpetrating owners, noting that
"where the owner's involvement in the offense is only incidental, as opposed to
extensive-e.g., where he is simply aware of the offense but not a perpetrator or
conspirator-this fact will weigh on the excessiveness side of the scales." United
States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 364 (4th Cir. 1994); see also United States v.
Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1995).
103 See, e.g., United States v. G.P.S. Automotive Corp., 66 F.3d 483, 501 (2d
Cir. 1995) (claiming that "most courts" have embraced "what has come to be
called a "proportionality test," and then referring to three federal cases that
employed proportionality factors other than monetary value of the property:
United States v. 9638 Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d 327, 330 (8th Cir. 1994); United
States v. RR # 1, 14 F.3d 864, 872-76 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. 6625
Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 731-38 (C.D. Cal. 1994)); see also Chandler,
36 F.3d at 363 (noting that "[t]he tendency of the courts, including [RR # I and
Zumirez] .. .has been to combine the two principles of instrumentality and
proportionality to come up with various multifactor tests").
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
A. The Simplistic Proportionality Approach
The proportionality approach, as originally applied to civil
forfeiture by the Second Circuit in Whalers Cove, involved a
balancing of the harshness of the penalty against the gravity of the
underlying offense with which the property was associated.' °4 A
serious weakness of this approach, however, is that harsh and
unjust penalties result from strictly comparing real property value
to the severe sentencing standards of federal anti-drug laws. For
example, in United States v 429 South Main Street,'15 the Sixth
Circuit upheld the forfeiture of a home worth less than
$84,000.00.106 The claimant had previously been convicted of
making two sales of marijuana, totaling less than four ounces, on
his premises. 10 7 Similar to the facts in Whalers Cove, undercover
agents in 429 South Main Street had initiated the transactions with
the claimant and had suggested that the purchases take place in his
home. 0
8
Under certain circumstances, the Whalers Cove proportionality
approach might actually benefit owners with expensive property
and might harm those who own less expensive real estate. As the
concurrence in United States v Chandler'°9 noted, "property
could still be deemed non-forfeitable under a proportionality
inquiry if it were, for instance, an extremely expensive home or
automobile. Too frequently, proportionality analysis serves only to
insulate those who have 'hit it big' in the drug trade from the
forfeiture prescribed by statute."" 0 Fortunately, in the last year,
.04 See supra text accompanying note 78 (describing the Whalers Cove
analysis).
'o' 52 F.3d 1416 (6th Cir. 1995).
106 Id. at 1424 (Guy, C.J., dissenting). The Sixth Circuit based its decision
on the fact that the claimant could have received up to $500,000.00 in federal
fines. Id. at 1422.
1o7 Id. at 1423 (Guy, J., dissenting).
o Id. (Guy, J., dissenting) (discussing the entrapment issue); see also supra
note 81.
'o' 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1994).
"' Id. at 369 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
CIVIL FORFEITURE
the Whalers Cove approach has fallen out of favor with most
circuits."'
B. The Instrumentality Approach
In contrast to the Whalers Cove approach, the Second and
Fourth Circuits have gravitated towards an instrumentality approach
to determine whether forfeiture is excessive.1 2 In Chandler,"3
the Fourth Circuit formally rejected proportionality and embraced
Justice Scalia's instrumentality approach." 4 Chandler is worth
considering in detail because it was favorably cited in Milbrand
where the Second Circuit adopted Chandler instrumentality
language almost word-for-word in fashioning its perpetrator
test. 115
... See supra note 95 (noting the federal circuits that have formally adopted
multifactor approaches). But see Chandler, 36 F.3d at 358 (rejecting the use of
proportionality in excessive fines analysis); United States v. 429 S. Main Street,
52 F.3d 1416, 1422 (6th Cir. 1995) (affirming lower court's use of strictly
monetary proportionality approach).
12 United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Chandler, 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1994).
13 Chandler involved a forfeiture action against a secluded 33-acre parcel
and farmhouse for alleged drug activity, even though the claimant had never been
convicted of any drug offense. Chandler, 36 F.3d at 362. Testimony at trial
indicated that the owner had paid his hired help with marijuana and cocaine, and
that one of these workers had observed bales of marijuana stored throughout the
house. Id. at 361. A surveillance camera system helped warn of unwanted
intruders, and one witness testified that he served as a lookout on the long
driveway leading to the house. Id. at 366.
114 Id. at 364 ("Accordingly, the constitutional limitation on the govern-
ment's action must be applied to the degree and the extent of the taint [of
criminal activity on the property] and not to the value of the property or the
gravity of the offense.").
.5 Chandler defines its instrumentality inquiry as "the nexus between the
offense and the property and the extent of the property's role in the offense." Id.
at 365. In defining "nexus", the Chandler court lists five factors:
[1] whether the use of the property in the offense was deliberate and
planned or merely incidental and fortuitous;
[2] whether the property was important to the success of the illegal
activity;
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The Chandler court criticized Whalers Cove . version of
proportionality and cited Justice Scalia's Austin concurrence in
arguing that instrumentality represented a more accurate view of
civil forfeiture within the context of the Controlled Substances
Act." 6 The court therefore held that the primary inquiry of an
excessive fines defense was the relationship between the property
and the underlying offense." 7
Despite this instrumentality approach, the Chandler court did
acknowledge that forfeiture partly served to punish the culpability
of property owners."' Therefore, without admitting it was devel-
oping a multifactor test, the court included in its instrumentality test
two factors more appropriately identified with a proportionality
analysis, namely "the role and culpability of the owner" and "the
possibility of separating offending property that can readily be
separated from the remainder."" 9
[3] the time during which the property was illegally used and the
spacial extent of its use;
[4] whether its illegal use was an isolated event or had been repeated;
and
[5] whether the purpose of acquiring, maintaining or using the property
was to carry out the offense.
Id. These factors are virtually the same as those the Milbrand court adopted for
the instrumentality part of the Second Circuit's perpetrator test. See supra text
accompanying note 50 (quoting the nexus test adopted by the Second Circuit).
16 The Chandler court quoted Justice Scalia's argument that because "the
property itself is the object of the action, and not its value ... the value of the
property is irrelevant to whether it is forfeitable." Chandler, 36 F.3d. at 364
(citations omitted). The court then extended Justice Scalia's rationale:
It is apparent that Congress, in providing for civil forfeiture of
property involved in drug offenses for which punishment exceeds one
year, did not intend to punish or fine by a particular amount or value;
instead, it intended to punish by forfeiting property of whatever value
which was tainted by the offense.
Id. at 363-64.
"17 Id. at 363-65.
118 "Nonetheless, a forfeiture of property effects punishment on its owner.
This appears more clearly so when, as provided in the Controlled Substances Act,
the forfeiture law provides an innocent owner defense, implying that some owner
culpability is being punished by the Act's forfeiture provisions." Id. at 363.
9 Id. at 365.
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Chandler's test makes a positive contribution towards checking
governmental abuse of forfeiture actions. It is both detailed and
methodical by allowing a court to automatically run through the
many factors that would determine whether a property is truly an
"instrument" of a criminal activity-that is, whether the property
is essential to the production, possession, or distribution of drugs.
Conversely, by being so specific, the test also helps determine if a
piece of property is not integral to a drug activity, and therefore not
subject to forfeiture. Finally, by tacitly acknowledging that a purely
instrumentality approach is constitutionally insufficient to protect
property owners' rights, 20 Chandler implies that a multifactor
test is not entirely inappropriate. Chandler use of proportionality
factors in its test should encourage other instrumentality courts to
also consider "other factors," as the Austin majority has author-
ized.' l
The danger of the Chandler approach, however, is that the
lower courts might not rigorously apply each element of the test.
Instead, they might equate an Eighth Amendment "instrumentality"
analysis with the "nexus" requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7),
which is a very easy standard for the government to attain. 22
Indeed, the concurrence in Chandler argued that the two inquiries
were very similar, stating:
[T]he standard established by § 881 goes far toward
answering the instrumentality inquiry .... [I]f the statu-
tory prerequisites for forfeiture are carefully observed, a
judgment of forfeiture generally will satisfy the instrumen-
tality test adopted by the court today. Eighth Amendment
120 See supra text accompanying notes 118-19 (noting that the Chandler
instrumentality test includes two elements associated with owner culpability and
proportionality).
12' Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 n.15 (1993).
122 See supra text accompanying notes 60-63; see also United States v. 6625
Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 733 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (noting that "[p]robable
cause for a civil forfeiture is comparatively easy for the government to establish
and it may seek to forfeit property linked with criminal activity where ... the
claimant has never been charged with any crime ... [or] the claimant has been
charged and acquitted").
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concerns will often be subsumed within the finding in favor
of forfeiture.123
Application of a primarily instrumentality approach, therefore,
might limit constitutional safeguards for property owners and lead
to injustice. 124
C. The Multifactor Approach
Most circuits that have adopted excessive fines tests have
openly embraced a multifactor approach, which can include a
variety of factors drawn from instrumentality, proportionality and
social policy concerns."' The multifactor approach allows for the
freedom to consider these other factors by discouraging courts, as
the Third Circuit suggested in United States v RR #1,126 from
23 Chandler, 36 F.3d at 368 (emphasis added).
.24 There is also a possibility that Chandler's instrumentality approach will
not survive in the Fourth Circuit. In United States v. Wild, 47 F.3d 669 (4th Cir.
1995), the Fourth Circuit reviewed Chandler's holding in the context of criminal
forfeiture, noting that:
Chandler's conclusion that proportionality is not to be considered in
determining whether an in rem forfeiture amounts to an excessive fine
stands alone among the circuits and could be viewed as inconsistent
with our decision in United States v. Borromeo [1 F.3d 219, 221 (4th
Cir. 1993)]. .. . Because we are distinguishing Chandler, this
inconsistency, if any, need not be addressed.
Wild, 47 F.3d at 673 n.10 (emphasis added). With the Second Circuit's holding
in Milbrand, of course, the Fourth Circuit no longer stands alone, at least in
terms of owners who have perpetrated the underlying offense. See supra text
accompanying note 50. However, Wild's ominous critique demonstrates that, at
the very least, the Fourth Circuit is not unanimous in support of the Chandler
approach.
125 See supra note 95 (noting courts that have used a multifactor approach
in determining excessiveness).
126 14 F.3d 864 (3d Cir. 1994). In RR #1, the trial court entered summary
judgment for the government against a property allegedly used for cocaine
distribution. Id. at 865. The Third Circuit remanded, holding that the owner's
affidavit denying the drug activity on the property raised a genuine issue of
material fact, and that in applying the Eighth Amendment to possible forfeiture,
the trial court should follow the Austin majority's mandate and consider the
factors the trial court deemed appropriate. Id. at 872-73.
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"conflating the Eighth Amendment inquiry with § 881 (a)(7)'s nexus
requirement."'' 27 This freedom thus authorizes courts to include
social policy considerations that are not part of the simplistic
Whalers Cove proportionality analysis. In United States v Shelly
Riverside Heights Lot X, 28 for instance, the Middle District of
Pennsylvania also took into account the fact the claimant's rural lot
and log cabin were his "only significant possessions," making
forfeiture unduly harsh.
29
Multifactor courts have also accentuated the effect of forfeiture
on innocent third parties.130 Before Austin, courts were generally
constrained from taking such important factors into account, often
leading to harsh results.' A notable exception was United States
v 835 Seventh Street, 32 a pre-Austin decision that relied on the
Second Circuit's Whalers Cove dicta on proportionality as
controlling. 33 In 835 Seventh Street, the government brought an
127 Id. at 873. While noting that Justice Scalia in his Austin concurrence
argued that the relevant inquiry was the "relationship of the property to the
offense," the Third Circuit maintained that "such an inquiry is by no means the
only possible inquiry." Id.
Subsequently, the Middle District of Pennsylvania followed the RR #1's
broad mandate in United States v. Shelly's Riverside Heights Lot X, 851 F. Supp.
633 (M.D. Pa. 1994), and included the claimant's degree of culpability as a
factor in its analysis. Id. at 638. Since there was no evidence that the claimant
in Shelly's Riverside was growing marijuana for anything other than his own
personal use, the court found that forfeiture would be excessive. Id
128 851 F. Supp. 633 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
129 Id. at 638.
130 See, e.g., United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Road, 59 F.3d 974, 985
(9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841, 848 (2d Cir. 1995);
United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 732 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
131 See supra note 65 (listing examples of harsh forfeiture actions against real
property).
132 820 F. Supp. 688 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
133 Citing Whalers Cove, the court in Seventh Street argued that "any civil
sanction that in effect is punishment invokes the protection of the Eighth
Amendment which is a 'personal' and 'humane' limitation on the government's
ability to punish an individual." Id. at 690 (citations omitted). The court then
followed "the Odyssean journey of Whalers Cove-a determination of
proportionality." Id. at 691.
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action against a small-time drug dealer for selling a small amount
of marijuana. The court stated in a footnote that:
it is impossible to decide the instant matter without
contemplating the effect which the forfeiture will have on
the four children in the Habiniak family ... because Mr.
Habiniak suffers from Multiple Sclerosis and that three of
the four children are "severely handicapped." [T]he court
has assessed the added burden which society will bear if
the four Habiniak children are "turned out into the street"
and, if it should go that far, become wards of state.
134
After Austin's, courts need no longer bury their social policy
concerns, as the court in 835 Seventh Street had done. Austin's
holding allowed courts to freely incorporate social policy concerns
as formal elements into their Eighth Amendment analyses.
Figure 4 illustrates the differences between the multifactor
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D. The Zumirez Test
The greatest challenge for courts using the multifactor test has
been to develop a comprehensive, logical test which incorporates
' Id. at 696 n.9 (citations omitted).
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all of the appropriate factors of proportionality, instrumentality and
social policy. Perhaps the most influential test developed thus far
is from a California district court decision, United States v 6625
Zumirez Drive.'
Zumirez dealt with a property owner whose son was selling
small amounts of drugs out of their family home. In deciding this
case, the Central District of California developed a test which
weighed three parts equally: "(i) the inherent gravity of the offense
compared with the harshness of the penalty; (ii) whether the
property was an integral part of the commission of the crime; and
(iii) whether the criminal activity involving the defendant property
was extensive in terms of time and/or spatial use."'36
Zumirez marks the first time a court articulated why, according
to Austin, forfeiture is based on the idea of the owner's culpa-
bility. 37 The Zumirez court argued that the Austin majority
justified forfeiture,
at bottom, on the notion that the owner had been negligent
in allowing his property to be misused and that he is
properly punished for that negligence. That the degree of
negligence or culpability of the claimant is relevant to
whether the forfeiture is excessive is implicit in that
conclusion. Because the [Austin] Court determined that
civil forfeiture, in part, punishes the claimant for his
offensive conduct, it is appropriate to analyze whether the
13' 845 F. Supp. 725 (C.D. Cal. 1994). As of January 1996, Zumirez has
been followed by seven different courts: United States v. 6380 Little Canyon
Road, 59 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. 24124 Lemay Street, 857 F.
Supp. 1373, 1382 (C.D. Cal. 1994); United States v. 1215 Kelly Road, 860 F.
Supp. 764, 766 (W.D. Wash. 1994); United States v. 461 Shelby Road 361, 857
F. Supp. 935, 939 (M.D. Ala. 1994); Aravanis v. Somerset County, 664 A.2d
888, 895 (Md. Ct. App. 1995); Thorpe v. State, 450 S.E.2d 416, 418 (Ga. 1994);
People ex rel. Michael J. Waller v. 1989 Ford F350 Truck, 642 N.E.2d 460, 465
(I11. 1994). Surprisingly, very little has been written about this case. See Stephen
L. Kessler, For Want of a Nail: Forfeiture and the Bill of Rights, 39 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 205 (1994) (providing the only current in-depth analysis of the
Zumirez decision).
136 Zumirez, 845 F. Supp at 732.
131 Id. at 733-34.
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fine is excessive in comparison with the claimant's
conduct. 138
Zumirez is also the first case to focus its attention on the
property owner's conduct, regardless of whether or not the owner
committed the underlying offense. 139 "Clearly," the court deter-
mined, "the focus of Eighth Amendment analysis should be on the
claimant's conduct" when analyzing the inherent gravity of the
offense. 4 ° As such, the Zumirez court intimated that nonperpe-
trator claimants should be judged by their own level of culpability,
not by the underlying offense of the perpetrator.
Finally, in defining the term "harshness" in the first prong of
its test, the Zumirez court was the first court to define property as
having an intangible as well as a monetary value.'14 While at
least one court previously had noted that if a property was a
residence that fact would weigh against forfeiture,'42 the Zumirez
court was the first to intelligently define why a residence was, in
a social sense, more valuable than its sale price. 4 3 For Zumirez,
a property that serves as a home for three handicapped children as
in 835 Seventh Avenue, can be more "valuable" than another home
that has a higher monetary value, but does not serve such a socially
useful purpose. 144
131 Id. at 733 n.4 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
139 Id. at 733.
140 Id. (emphasis added).
141 Id. at 734.
142 See United States v. 835 Seventh Street, 820 F. Supp. 688, 691
(N.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that "the substantial purpose of the defendant res was
to house the [claimant's] family and that any illicit use was merely incidental to
[the claimant's] personal predilections which did not consume or override the
primary function of the res").
143 In noting that "society and the courts place a higher value on real
property, in particular the home," the Zumirez court cited the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, where the Court
noted that "at stake in this and many other forfeiture cases are the security and
privacy of the home and those who take shelter within it." Zumirez, 845 F. Supp.
at 734 (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492,
505 (1993).
144 Zumirez, 845 F. Supp. at 734.
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The Zumirez approach to nonperpetrators, however, is not
without fault. First, instead of establishing a separate Eighth
Amendment test for nonperpetrators, the Zumirez court analyzed the
owner's role in the third prong of its test, according to a
three-tiered approach that included the following different factual
situations: "(1) the claimant has been convicted of the criminal act
or acts underlying the forfeiture; (2) the claimant has never been
charged with any crime; and (3) the claimant has been charged and
acquitted of the act or acts underlying the forfeiture." '45
Strangely, in a passage without citation, the Zumirez court
claims that a court should scrutinize those never charged with
criminal activity more closely than those who were charged and
acquitted:
In the first situation [conviction], the court can easily
evaluate the gravity of the offensive conduct since the
court need not engage in assumptions: the claimant did in
fact commit the offense which forms the basis of the
government's probable cause to forfeit the property. In the
second situation [never charged], the court cannot assume
that the claimant committed the offense. Neither can it
assume that he did not. This claimant's conduct must be
viewed as necessarily less grave than that of the claimant
convicted in the first situation, but the conduct is inherently
more grave than that of the claimant in the third situation
[charged and acquitted]. The behavior of the claimant in
the third situation must be considered the least grave: the
claimant has been charged and acquitted of the underlying
offense, and cannot be treated "as if' he had committed
that offense for purposes of evaluating the gravity of his
conduct. 146
The logical flaw in the court's argument is that those who have
been acquitted were found not guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. 147 Those who have not been charged, on the other hand,
145 Id.
146 Id. (emphasis added).
147 To establish guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt" is to determine it so as to
be "fully satisfied, entirely convinced, [or] satisfied to a moral certainty."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 161 (6th ed. 1990).
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have not given law enforcement authorities even probable cause to
arrest and charge them. In addition, the court's reasoning here flies
in the face of the policy in criminal law that an accused is
presumed innocent.14 Considering the quasi-criminal nature of
forfeiture,' 49 this presumption should be maintained for nonperpe-
trators in forfeiture actions as well.
Despite this flaw, Zumirez contribution is enormous. In
September 1995, the Second Circuit cited Zumirez favorably in a
post-Milbrand decision concerning an excessive fines defense. 150
In United States v G.PS., the trial court had not used a multifactor
test to determine the nonperpetrating owner's culpability.'5' The
Second Circuit, however, held that an "appropriate excessiveness
analysis entails a multifactor test combining the principles of both
instrumentality and proportionality.'1 2 The court subsequently
remanded the case for a more complete factual development of the
owner's culpability.'53
As in Zumirez, the legacy of federal case law to the Milbrand
court has been a cross-pollination of proportionality, instrumentality
and social policy concepts. In addition, some of the more important
"48 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) (holding that "the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he
is charged").
14' Austin v. the United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806 (1993) (recalling that
"[w]e said in United States v. Halper that 'a civil sanction that cannot fairly be
said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also
serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come
to understand the term"') (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 447-48
(1989)).
150 United States v. G.P.S. Automotive Corp., 66 F.3d 483 (2d Cir. 1995).
In G.P.S., the government brought a forfeiture against an auto "chop shop" for
facilitating the sale of stolen auto parts. Id. at 485-86. The trial court ordered
forfeiture, and the owners appealed. Id. at 486. The Second Circuit reversed and
remanded the case, holding that while owners did not have an innocent owner
defense, a full fact-finding was nevertheless necessary to determine proportion-
ality and instrumentality inquiries in their Eighth Amendment defense against the
forfeiture. Id. at 501.
'5 Id. at 485.
152 Id. at 501.
. Id. at 502.
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decisions have acknowledged that nonperpetrators should be treated
differently.'54 It has been up to the Milbrand court to synthesize
these concepts into a working test for nonperpetrators.
IV ASSESSING MILBRAND
The strengths and weaknesses of Milbrand nonperpetrator test
lie in the construction of the elements in its three-prong analysis.
The following sections examine each prong and evaluate how they
work together as one test.
A. Proportionality
The first prong of the Milbrand test is a proportionality factor
which balances the "harshness of the forfeiture" against "(a) the
gravity of the offense and (b) the sentence that could be imposed
on the perpetrator of such an offense."' 55 The court's description
of harshness in a subsequent parenthetical statement--"e.g., the
nature and value of the property and the effect of forfeiture on
innocent third parties" 156 -is the most innovative language in the
test because the description's inclusion of "nature" as well as
"value" indicates that the Second Circuit is considering a property's
intrinsic as well as monetary value. The addition of "innocent third
parties" reinforces the notion that the intrinsic value of a property
should be noted, particularly if it is a residence. Also, the court's
use of the term "e.g." in the parenthetical is significant, because it
does not limit the possible definitions of "harshness." This term
suggests that the Milbrand court may allow lower courts to be
innovative in determining what other factors are appropriate. Thus,
Milbrand definition of harshness is much closer to that of
Zumirez than to Whalers Cove. 
157
1 United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 365 (3d Cir. 1994); United States
v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 733-35 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
' United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841, 848 (2d Cir. 1995).
156 Id.
157 See supra text accompanying notes 74 and 141-44 (comparing the
differing definitions of harshness for Zumirez and Whalers Cove).
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The Milbrand court weakens the proportionality factor,
however, by not drawing a complete distinction between perpetrator
and nonperpetrator culpability. The court balances its harshness
element against two countervailing elements, the first of which is
the "gravity of the offense." ' A lower court using this standard
must then logically inquire, the gravity of whose offense? The
offense of the perpetrator of the underlying crime, or the nonperpe-
trating owner? The answer to this question would bear greatly on
the outcome of the proportionality analysis, as the following
example demonstrates.
In Zumirez, a father permitted his son to continue to live at
home, despite the fact that his son was involved with drugs. 9
After the son was arrested and the government commenced a
forfeiture action, the court had to determine whether to weigh the
gravity of the son's criminal act, or the gravity of the father's
negligence in allowing someone to use the property for criminal
activity. 6 ' The court there determined that
[i]t is unrealistic to expect that forfeiture laws will induce
parents to evict children from their homes. This does not
mean that parents should be shielded from the forfeiture
laws; rather, it means that the court considers the relation-
ship between the parties in evaluating the gravity of the
landowner 's conduct.16
1
The court's distinction is more than semantic. First, by focusing on
the property owner, the Zumirez court remained true to the
underlying principle of forfeiture law as defined by the Austin
majority, that forfeiture punishes the owner's negligence.'62
In addition, focusing on the "negligence" of the nonperpetrator
limits the scope of the claimant's punishment. In tort law, for
example, the underlying purpose of a tort action is to make the
" Milbrand, 58 F.3d at 848.
'5 United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 736 (C.D. Cal.
1994).
160 Id.
161 Id. (emphasis added).
162 Id. at 733; see also Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2808
(1993).
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injured party whole.163 Analogizing this principle to a forfeiture
action, the plaintiff government would then be suing the negligent
owner for the cost of investigating and arresting the criminal who
had used the owner's property.164 Also, punitive damages in tort
law are limited to those defendants who have committed gross
negligence. 165 Therefore, an owner would have to be more than
"merely aware" of the drug activity to have his or her property
forfeited. 166
Unfortunately, the Milbrand court failed to define "gravity of
the offense" in terms of the nonperpetrating owner's culpability.
However, defining "gravity" in terms of the nonperpetrator would
be more compatible with the Second Circuit's own rationale for
creating a separate, nonperpetrating test:
Where the owner of the property is not the perpetrator of
the crime, however, a consistent approach requires analysis
of the amount of the penalty in light of the role and
culpability of the owner in the illicit use of her prop-
erty. 1
67
Applying this new interpretation in the future would dramatically
improve the Milbrand nonperpetrator test.
163 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 4, at 20 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that "it is sometimes said that compensation for
losses is the primary function of tort law and the primary factor influencing its
development").
164 See United States v. 835 Seventh Street, 820 F. Supp. 688, 696 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (stating that "the practical effect [of forfeiting the claimant's home] would
be to greatly overcompensate the government for the enforcement costs related
to this drug sale and would do little to remove 'an instrumentality of crime' from
the streets").
165 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 163, at 20 ("Where the defendant's
wrongdoing has been intentional and deliberate, and has the character of outrage
frequently associated with crime, all but a few courts have permitted the jury to
award in the tort action 'punitive' or 'exemplary' damages, or what is sometimes
called 'smart money."').
166 Defining gravity in terms of owner culpability would also be in line with
Chandler's dicta that "mere awareness" of an offense by a homeowner would
"weigh on the excessive side of the scales." See United States v. Chandler, 36
F.3d 358, 364 (4th Cir. 1994).
167 Milbrand, 58 F.3d at 847 (emphasis added).
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The other countervailing element in Milbrand proportionality
prong is "the sentence that could be imposed on the perpetrator of
such an offense."' 68 This language is a throwback to Solem,
169
and is more appropriate for a perpetrator test than a nonperpetrator
test. As with the "gravity of the offense" element, this "sentencing"
element makes an owner unduly culpable to the perpetrator on the
owner's property, by making the owner responsible for the
consequences of others' actions, without directly considering the
owner's role in the underlying criminal activity.
The presence of the "sentencing" factor is also aggravated by
the presence of the verb "could." Courts split over whether to
impose the maximum sentence as prescribed by federal and state
law, or the minimum possible standard. 7 ° Furthermore, courts
have split over whether to use the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines'7' as a source in calculating possible fines in forfeiture
actions, or whether instead to use the much stiffer penalties as
provided in the Controlled Substances Act; 72 the difference in
161 Id. at 847-48.
169 The Court in Solem mandated that lower courts consider "the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction," as well as "the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
7o See United States v. 429 S. Main Street, 52 F.3d 1416 (6th Cir. 1995)
(holding that forfeiture of $83,700.00 residence is not excessive when claimant
could have received $500,000.00 in federal fines). But see United States v. 835
Seventh Street, 820 F. Supp.688, 694 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Further, the court finds
that it would be preposterous to assume for present purposes that the maximum
penalty allowed by § 841 should be used for the proportionality determination.")
(emphasis added).
' UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1994).
172 21 U.S.C. § 841; see also 832 Seventh Street, 820 F. Supp. at 694. The
court in 835 Seventh Street stated that:
[D]espite the fact that one district court within the Second Circuit has
held that "it is the statute, and not the Guidelines, which provides the
proper guide to determine seriousness," this court declines to strictly
apply such a rule. Rather, the court shall apply the possibility of high
monetary sanctions under 21 U.S.C. § 841 as one of the many factors
it will consider, along with the penalty under the Guidelines, to
determine proportionality.
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comparable fines set out in the Guidelines and the Act can
sometimes be hundreds of thousands of dollars. Fortunately, in
Milbrand the Second Circuit indicates that it has abandoned the
harsh position it took earlier in Whalers Cove, by calculating the
minimum possible penalty for the criminal defendant.'73
B. Instrumentality
The second prong of the nonperpetrator test represents the
instrumentality factor in the Milbrand analysis. The court defined
this factor as "the relationship between the property and the
offense.' 74 The court also included three different elements to
determine this relationship, "including whether use of the property
in the offense was (a) important to the success of the illegal
activity, (b) deliberate and planned or merely incidental and
fortuitous, and (c) temporally or spatially extensive.' 1 75 This
language is drawn directly from Chandler, and represents the best
of what instrumentality can offer.'76 By incorporating Chandler
precise language, the Second Circuit will hopefully restrain the
government from continuing to make constitutionally frivolous civil
forfeiture actions, 177 and will force the government to carefully
consider whether the property in question was a true instrumentality
of the underlying crime.
C. Culpability of the Owner
The third prong of the nonperpetrator test considers "the role
and degree of culpability of the owner."'1 78 It is commendable that
' United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841, 848 (2d Cir. 1995). The




176 United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 1994).
177 For examples of frivolous forfeitures, see generally Mary M. Cheh, Can
Something This Easy, Quick, and Profitable Also Be Fair? Runaway Civil
Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1 (1994).
171 Milbrand, 58 F.3d at 848.
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the Milbrand court included this as a distinct element in its test,
which is also the second element of the Chandler test. 179 How-
ever, as indicated above, it is confusing and distorting to have the
"harshness" balancing element physically separated from the
"culpability" element. As the Milbrand court noted, its test is
essentially "an analysis of the amount of the penalty in light of the
role and culpability of the owner in the illicit use of her prop-
erty.' 1
80
A more appropriate construction for the nonperpetrator test
would include an approach that clearly segregates the instrumen-
tality and proportionality elements of the test, and makes clear that
it is the nonperpetrating owner ' culpability that is at issue, not the
perpetrator of the underlying offense. Accordingly, a clearer
construction would be:
(1) the harshness of the forfeiture compared to the role and
degree of the culpability of the owner, and (2) the relation-
ship between the property and the offense, including
whether use of the property in the offense was (a) impor-
tant to the success of the illegal activity, (b) deliberate and
planned or merely incidental and fortuitous, and (c)
temporally or spatially extensive.
The "gravity of the offense" should be properly understood as
simply one of several factors in determining the owner's culpa-
bility.
' See Chandler, 36 F.3d at 365 (listing the five elements in its nexus test).
80 Milbrand, 58 F.3d at 847.
The first application of the Milbrand nonperpetrator test dealt with a strong
case of owner culpability. In United States v. 143-147 East 23rd Street, 77 F.3d
648 (2d Cir. 1996), the government sought forfeiture under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881 (a)(7) of the notorious Kenmore Hotel in Manhattan, the largest commercial
single occupancy building in the city, after city police and other law enforcement
officials repeatedly urged the owning company to take measures to end drug
trafficking in the hotel. Id. at 649. At one point, an assistant district attorney
warned the owner's representative that there had been dozens of arrests
associated with the building, as well as three drug-related homicides. Id. at 650.
The owner, however, took minimal effort in securing the building. Id. at 655.
The Second Circuit affirmed the government's forfeiture, holding that under the
multifactor test created in Milbrand, the owner's willful blindness constituted
legal culpability. Id. at 659.
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Finally, the "sentencing" factor should be omitted altogether. It
is adopted from part of the Solem test that is inappropriate to a
civil forfeiture inquiry.'' As the court in Chandler indicated,
Solem' proportionality analysis has historically been tied to the
Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, not
the Excessive Fines Clause. 2 Lower courts have used this
argument to reject a blanket adoption of the Solem test to civil
forfeiture.8 3 Furthermore, the facts of Solem suggest that its
analysis is distinct from a civil action: it dealt with incarceration,
where comparison of sentences would be appropriate to determine
if there is cruel and unusual punishment. 8 4 The comparison of
criminal fines in a civil action, as the Second Circuit mechanis-
tically made in Whalers Cove, is not so appropriate.
Figure 5 illustrates the proposed improvements to Milbrand:
Figure 5 IMPROVING MILBRAND
Instrumentality Proportionality Culpability
Factor Factor Factor
Harshness of the Culpability
Forfeiture vs. Gravity of the
of the Offense and Owner
ossible Sentence 
-
Remains Harshness of the Forfeiture vs.
the Same Culpability of the Owner
Despite these shortcomings, the Milbrand test represents a
marked improvement for civil forfeiture law, by synthesizing
181 See supra text accompanying notes 76-79 (discussing inapplicability of
Solem to civil forfeiture context).
12 Chandler, 36 F.3d at 365.
' Id.; United States v. Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 731 (C.D. Cal.
1994).
184 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983).
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elements from several sources, and drawing attention to the need
to distinguish nonperpetrators in an excessive fines analysis.
V. LESSONS FROM LITTLE CANYON ROAD
Thus far, this Note has touched on two major problems in civil
forfeiture law. First, as the Zumirez court noted, bringing a civil
forfeiture action has been procedurally easy for the government,
and has led to widespread abuse.' 85 The second problem is the
difficulty in determining what excessiveness means within the civil
forfeiture context. To that end, courts have struggled to create a
working definition of the term, employing such factors as harshness
of the forfeiture, culpability of the owner and relationship between
the property and the criminal offense. 8 6 This struggle has been
essentially a problem of substantive law, with courts offering
various tests to balance these different factors. 87
A recent Ninth Circuit case offers a procedural solution to both
of these problems. A month after the Second Circuit decision in
Milbrand, the Ninth Circuit developed its own multifactor test in
United States v 6380 Little Canyon Road.' Finding in favor of
the property owner, the court in Little Canyon Road echoed
Zumirez by holding that excessiveness should be at least partially
connected to the owner culpability.'89 Little Canyon Road went
a step further than Zumirez, however, by procedurally separating
the instrumentality and proportionality inquiries. 9 °
The court mandated that once a claimant raises an Eighth
Amendment defense, the burden of the proof must shift back to the
government to show a substantial connection between the property
185 See supra text accompanying notes 62-66 (documenting general
prosecutorial abuse of forfeiture).
186 See supra part (discussing various approaches towards excessive fines
defenses in civil forfeiture).
187 See supra text accompanying notes 101-03 (introducing the three basic
approaches by federal courts towards excessiveness).
.8 59 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1995).




and the offense.19" ' If the government demonstrates this connec-
tion, the burden shifts back again to the claimant, this time to show
that forfeiture of the property would be grossly disproportionate
given the nature and extent of the claimant's criminal culpabi-
lity.19
2
The beauty of the Little Canyon Road two-step approach is that
it alters the presently unjust procedure in a 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)
action. After Little Canyon Road, when a claimant raises an
excessive fines defense in the Ninth Circuit, the burden shifts back
to the government to prove that the property represents a "true
instrumentality" of the underlying crime.' 93 Additionally, the
government must prove this instrumentality by a preponderance of
the evidence, not just show probable cause.' 94 Furthermore, if
courts interpret "instrumentality" for Eighth Amendment purposes
'9' Id. at 985. The court distinguished between the statutory "nexus" standard
and the higher "substantial connection" standard it was adopting for Eighth
Amendment purposes. Id. at 985 n. 11.
192 Id. at 985. The court defined its proportionality inquiry as the harshness
of the forfeiture, "bearing in mind any in personam punishment of the owner."
Id. (emphasis added). The harshness factors included: "(1) the fair market value
of the property; (2) the intangible, subjective value of the property, e.g., whether
it is the family home; and (3) the hardship to the defendant including the effect
of the forfeiture on defendant's family or financial condition." Id
In addition, the Ninth Circuit instructed lower courts to consider the
culpability of the owner, gauged by the following factors:
(1) whether the owner was negligent or reckless in allowing the
illegal use of his property; or
(2) whether the owner was directly involved in the illegal activity,
and to what extent; and
(3) the harm caused by the illegal activity, including (a) (in the drug
trafficking context) the amount of drugs and their value, (b) the
duration of the illegal activity, and (c) the effect on the com-
munity.
Id. at 986. If forfeiture of a property were found to be excessive under this
proportionality inquiry, the court instructed lower courts to consider severability
as an option, limiting the forfeiture either "to an appropriate portion or the more
poisonously tainted portion of the property." Id. at 987.
193 Id. at 985.
194 Id. at 985-86.
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the same as Chandler, it will be a much more rigorous inquiry than
the easy "nexus" statutory requirement. If the government can
demonstrate that the property was indeed an instrumentality in the
underlying offense, the burden shifts back to the claimant to prove
that the forfeiture will be disproportionately excessive. 195
Figure 6 illustrates the Little Canyon Approach:
Figure 6
Burden-shifting under Little Canyon Road
Action Instrumentality Proportionality
Commences Threshhold Inquiry
Claimant Must Government Claimant Must
Raise Excessive Must Prove Demonstrate
Fines Defense Property is a Forfeiture is
True Instrumentality Unneccessarily
of the Crime Harsh
By reserving a proportionality inquiry until this procedural
phase of the case, the Little Canyon Road approach helps simplify
the substantive problem of determining what excessiveness means.
Now lower courts in the Ninth Circuit can determine proportion-
ality on their own, instead of having to undertake the unenviable
task of weighing it against instrumentality factors, as courts must
do in other circuits. Thus, Little Canyon Road offers a simple and
just process to follow.
CONCLUSION
The two years since Austin have demonstrated that there is an
opportunity to curb the "prosecutorial zeal" made too easily
195 Id. at 985.
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available by federal civil forfeiture law.'96 During this period,
many federal courts have shown a willingness to adopt sophisti-
cated Eighth Amendment analyses that, at the very least, have
stymied the more egregious forfeiture actions brought by the
federal government.'97 Other courts, however, have restricted
themselves to simplistic definitions of constitutional excessive-
ness, 19 or have rigidly adhered to the in rem origins of civil
forfeiture.'99 These latter approaches have offered little in the
way of reforming the present crisis in civil forfeiture.
Milbrand represents the best and the worst of these judicial
responses to Austin. On the one hand, it marks a major step
forward in representing the rights of nonperpetrators in civil
forfeiture actions. The Milbrand court's synthesis of instrumentality
and proportionality elements also offers a general improvement
over other circuits by producing an articulated test that lower courts
can follow. By mechanistically adopting language, however, that is
more suited for Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause analysis than
for Excessive Fines Clause defenses, the Milbrand court unfairly
taints its nonperpetrator test with the culpability of the perpetrator
of the underlying offense.
Courts should not end their excessiveness analyses with the
limited success of Milbrand, but should continue to synthesize and
innovate the multifactor approach, as did the Little Canyon Road
court by procedurally separating instrumentality and proportionality
inquiries. By recognizing both the improvements and the limitations
of Milbrand, courts in the future will be able to offer more just
protection to civil forfeiture claimants, particularly to nonperpe-
trators.
196 In re Assets of Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 1360 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that
"the Supreme Court's application of Eighth Amendment limitations to forfeitures
suggests to us that we need to keep prosecutorial zeal for such remedies within
particular boundaries").
197 See supra text accompanying notes 125-34 (providing a general
evaluation of the multifactor approach).
198 See supra text accompanying notes 104-10 (critiquing the simplistic
proportionality approach).
199 Seesupratextaccompanyingnotes 112-24 (evaluatingthe instrumentality
approach adopted in part by the Second and Fourth Circuits).

